

South American Battleground: Soviet and American Involvement in Chile During the Cold War

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Abstract: The twentieth century was a period marred with violence and struggles for power beyond what was seen in the past. This affected all regions of the world through two World Wars and a nearly half-century long conflict between two world powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Chile was one area of the world where this struggle came to a head, but not in an entirely apparent manner. This paper seeks to examine both the United States and the Soviet Union's role in influencing Chilean politics, and how it affected their society, in both overt and covert ways. Beginning with the Gabriel Gonzalez Videla administration in the mid to late 1940s and ending with the fall of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in 1990, this paper demonstrates how Chile can be viewed as one microcosm of the global struggle between American and Soviet dominance and how democracies can turn into dictatorships overnight.

Major Department: History

After the Second World War, the victorious powers of the United States and the Soviet Union went from being Allies in their fight against Nazi Germany to bitter rivals for more than four decades. As such, they each began hunting for more influence outside their respective spheres, which often manifested into proxy wars such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War. In addition to these overt conflicts, both powers used covert operations to sway generally neutral regions and nations to their causes. In the hotly contested region of Latin America, Chile was influenced greatly by the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective blocs. This influence came at the request of many powerful Chileans, but oftentimes was meant to be secret, with proof of involvement to be hidden from the general populace. The United States wanted to maintain Chile as a bulwark against other Communist movements in South America, and the Soviet Union viewed Chile as an avenue to prevent American hegemony in South America. This was seen in early anti-communist measures enacted based on pressure from the United States, to the Salvador Allende government's relationship with the Soviets, and to violence within Augusto Pinochet's American-backed regime. While largely covert, Chile proved to be the greatest point of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union in South America.

Early Period and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla (1946-1952)

During the Second World War, Chile was an Allied nation along with both the United States and the Soviet Union, albeit to a minimal extent, due to Chile's faraway location from the main theaters of war in Europe and the Pacific. Chile already had diplomatic relations with the

United States dating back to the country's inception in the early nineteenth century.¹ Official relations with the Soviet Union were established in 1944, shortly before the end of the Second World War.² Once the United States and the Soviet Union sought to protect and spread their interests globally, Latin America immediately became a hot target for both sides. United States President Harry Truman invoked his Truman Doctrine, which had the intent of preserving capitalist democracies from Soviet communism and keeping it in "containment."³ This meant the United States would fund many anti-communist movements worldwide as they saw necessary. Similarly, the Soviet Union sought to spread its influence throughout the world, funding various socialist movements around the world, while they first sought to focus on national security and economic recovery from the devastation of the Second World War.⁴ In the meantime, Chile began to decide which faction to align themselves with when tensions rose between the Soviet Union and the United States. Beginning with the presidency of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla (1946-1952), Chile saw itself as more of a partner to the United States and the Western powers. Under the Gonzalez government came the enactment of the Law of Permanent Defense of the Democracy (*Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia*), also known as the "cursed law" (*ley maldita*), in Chile.⁵ This saw the Communist Party of Chile outlawed, with all Communist ministers dismissed from government and labor positions. Anyone accused of making pro-Communist statements would be removed from their jobs, and all foreign Communist

¹ Blinken, Antony. 2023. "Bicentennial of U.S.-Chile Official Relations." United States Department of State. United States Department of State. January 27, 2023. <https://www.state.gov/bicentennial-of-u-s-chile-official-relations/>.

² "Cooperation with Chile | Rosoboronexport." 2024. Roe.ru. Rosoboronexport. 2024. <https://roe.ru/eng/export/chili-respublika-chili/>.

³ Office of the Historian. 2019. "The Truman Doctrine, 1947." History.state.gov. United States Department of State. 2019. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>.

⁴ Hudson, William. 1976. "From Confrontation to Coexistence: The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy.", 26. California State University, Sacramento. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA045380.pdf>.

⁵ Lockhart, James. "La Ley Maldita: The Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy." In *Chile, the CIA and the Cold War: A Transatlantic Perspective*, Edinburgh University Press, 2019, 98-125 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctvnjbhc1.7>.

sympathizers would be deported and denied entry into Chile.⁶ Gonzalez, who had Communist ministers in his cabinet, became increasingly anti-Communist throughout his presidency due to increasing strikes from coal miners, as well as perceived Soviet and Eastern Bloc influence on labor movements. To elaborate, Gonzalez had concluded that some Yugoslav and Czechoslovak diplomats had utilized the *Comité Coordinador Intereslavo en Chile*, a Slavic people interests group, to order the Chilean Communist Party to start their strikes on the coal mines.⁷ Whether or not the allegations were truthful, he was motivated to act against the Communists as a result of fear of potential foreign influence. Once Gonzalez became angered by the coal mine strikes, he asked the United States for an emergency supply of coal. The request was only approved after Gonzalez had removed the Communist ministers.⁸ Thus, the United States' influence became a strong factor in this shift toward anti-Communist sentiment in the Chilean government and demonstrated the patron-client relationship Chile was beginning to develop with the United States.

American Dominance: Presidencies of Ibanez and Alessandri (1952-1964)

Following the anti-Communist groundwork laid during Gonzalez's presidency, Chile was in a period of largely American over Soviet foreign involvement. The leaders of Chile during this period were politically moderate, and viewed the United States as a better partner than the Soviet Union. Succeeding Gonzalez in 1952 was Carlos Ibanez, who continued to enable the United States to be involved in Chilean affairs, especially the economy. The Chilean economy was in a

⁶ Lockhart, "La Ley Maldita: The Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy." 98-125

⁷ Lockhart, "La Ley Maldita: The Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy.", 98-125

⁸ Qureshi, Lubna. 2009. *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*. 22. Lexington Books.

massive recession, and Ibanez sought foreign involvement to alleviate much of the inflation. The United States was receptive to this and agreed to send advisors through the Klein-Saks Mission. The group advised Ibanez and his government to enact policies that would alleviate inflation, but at the cost of the well-being of Chilean workers.⁹ For instance, they supported cutting funds for public organizations, as well as any funding for necessary goods.¹⁰ While these methods did prove to mend some of Chile's economic woes, albeit with minimal success, they ensured that Chile would need the United States to fix its internal strife due to the precedent set by sending groups of advisors like the Klein-Saks mission. This, in turn, would benefit the United States' foreign relations, which were still very focused on curbing the spread of Soviet influence and Communism in the Americas.

In 1958, Ibanez left office, and Jorge Alessandri became the new President of Chile. Alessandri largely continued Ibanez's trend of allowing the United States to introduce methods to stimulate the Chilean economy. He lowered tariffs on imports in 1959, which heavily saturated the Chilean economy with goods from the United States, and took more American loans, which only made Chile more reliant on the United States.¹¹ Alessandri was also facing calls from the Chilean people to enact agrarian land reform laws, as land distribution in Chile was generally unfair towards impoverished farmers. Meanwhile, John F. Kennedy became President of the United States in 1961 and intended to focus on Latin American foreign policy. To strengthen diplomatic relations and bolster Latin American economies, Kennedy established the Alliance for Progress, further expanding the United States' influence on the region. Kennedy saw this organization as a way to improve Latin American infrastructure and deter Communist movements from organizing against other U.S.-aligned governments, as was the case in Cuba.

⁹ Qureshi, 22

¹⁰ Qureshi, 22

¹¹ Qureshi, 25

Coincidentally, the Alliance for Progress' creation coincided with the pressure Alessandri's government was receiving to reform Chilean land. In addition, representatives of the Alliance for Progress were among those pressuring Alessandri to enact agrarian reform, and in 1962, the first of many land reform laws were passed. This law redistributed land to impoverished farmers, created organizations to oversee the process, and aided the farmers in using the land properly.¹² Aside from this legislation, Alessandri's presidency was largely complacent with U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs, as was Ibanez before him.

Renewed Rise of Socialism and the Election of 1970 (1964-1970)

Throughout the presidencies of Ibanez and Alessandri, the ideas of Socialism and Communism were still present but not powerful enough for much influence. *La Ley Maldita* was repealed during the Ibanez presidency, which settled fears of persecution for being associated with Communism. This, in turn, allowed the movement to grow more popular throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. During this period, many Socialist leaders began to gain some attention from the average Chilean populace, the most notable being Salvador Allende. Allende spent much of his life from the 1930s onwards advocating for Chilean worker movements, and achieved moderate local political success. Over time, he became more well-known nationwide, and made two bids for the Presidency in 1952 and 1958, running on a Socialist platform. Once Alessandri's presidency came to a close, left-wing ideas came to the forefront of Chilean politics again. Many Chileans wanted an extensive continuation of Alessandri's land reform legislation. They were drawn to Allende due to his promises of continuation of labor reform. As a result,

¹² La Reforma Agraria (1962-1973)," Memoria Chilena. 2023], <https://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-3536.html>

Allende began to accrue more support for his bid for the 1964 election, which deeply unsettled the U.S., as they believed that there was a possibility of another revolutionary Socialist takeover, as was the case in Cuba.¹³ To curb Allende's backing, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sought to aid his opposition. Running against Allende on a Christian Democrat platform friendly to American interests was Eduardo Frei. The CIA viewed the moderate Frei as the best candidate for continued allowance of American influence in the country, and chose to invest in him. They spent \$2.6 million funding Frei's campaign, and another \$3 million producing anti-Allende propaganda which sought to turn voters towards Frei.¹⁴

The investment was successful, and Frei was elected president. This was a significant victory for the U.S. in their efforts to influence Chile directly; it meant Frei would continue to be receptive to the Alliance for Progress' efforts to send more funds to help Chilean infrastructure.¹⁵ By 1968, the Alliance's funds aided Frei's administration in putting more than half a million additional students in schools, lowering unemployment by around two percent, and expanding housing for millions.¹⁶ However, when it came to the 1970 election, many within Frei's party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, or PDC) felt that running on their achievements during the administration would not be popular with their constituents. Many felt the progress was either too fast or too slow. As a result, the more leftist elements left the party to ally with Allende's renewed bid for the Presidency, and the more conservative elements left to join Alessandri's bid. This left the PDC's candidate Radomiro Tomic reluctantly embracing Frei's more progressive elements.¹⁷ This was not a good sign for the U.S., as it gave more strength to Allende and the

¹³ Power, Margaret. "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election." *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 5 (2008): 931-953. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24915965>.

¹⁴ "Chile 1964: CIA Covert Support in Frei Election Detailed." Nsarchive2.Gwu.edu. National Security Archive. National Security Archive. 2004. September 27, 2004. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20040925/index.htm>.

¹⁵ Sands, David R. "Chile Under Frei: The Alliance for Progress," *Fletcher Forum* 6, no. 1 (Winter 1982). 33-60 https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein_journals/forwa6&id=39&collection=journals&index=

¹⁶ Sands, 59

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 59

other Marxist elements of Chile and left a divided center. The CIA used methods similar to those used in their campaign against Allende in the 1964 election to sway the Chilean population away from him, but it became increasingly clear that these methods would not work once again. It became especially clear once attempts to bribe the conservative military leadership ended in chaos. The CIA contacted retired General Roberto Viaux, who was known for his right-wing beliefs and was involved in many conservative civilian groups, as he and other like-minded officers would be the most willing to carry out a coup. However, the CIA had advised them to wait, as the likelihood of a successful outcome became minimal. Viaux and other officers went ahead anyway, with their first step being kidnapping General Rene Schneider, the commander of the Chilean Army. However, Schneider was killed during the attempted abduction, which sent shockwaves throughout the Chilean Army and populace, and Viaux's plot and any other plots were abandoned.¹⁸ Allende took office on November 3, 1970. The U.S. thus became deeply fearful of renewed Soviet and Cuban involvement in Chilean affairs.¹⁹

The Soviet Union and Salvador Allende's Presidency (1970-1973)

As a Marxist, Allende wanted to distance Chile from the U.S. and the Capitalist West. Fortunately for Allende, the Soviets were interested in increasing trade relations during Allende's presidency, with a rise in trade from three hundred thousand U.S. dollars per year in 1969 to about 8 million USD in 1971. This trade was mainly meant to enrich Chile, as most of the shipments were Soviet.²⁰ They also saw little need to establish military bases in Chile, as the

¹⁸ "Hinchey Report," United States Department of State, 2000, <https://web.archive.org/web/20091020110606/http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp>.

¹⁹ Hinchey Report," United States Department of State <https://web.archive.org/web/20091020110606/http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp>.

²⁰ Leonov, Nikolai. "Soviet Intelligence in Latin America during the Cold War". *Estudios Públicos*, vol. 74, Summer 1999, 6

Soviet military was primarily focused on domestic rocket and missile development.²¹ Instead, the Soviets were mostly concerned with supporting Chile politically. Chile having a Marxist leader in power meant U.S. influence in South America could be curbed. The Soviets would send Chile weapons and other forms of aid as a means to stop U.S. dominance domestically.²² The Soviet Union sent supplies to build factories to create homes, aid fishing, and other ways to increase Chilean production.

In conjunction with the aid Chile was receiving from the Soviets, Allende was rapidly changing Chilean society, creating a more Soviet-style economy. Allende enacted a more radical form of agrarian reform overseen by his predecessors by draining all of the funds provided by the *latifundia* banks created by the Alliance for Progress and allocating them towards the central government. This would have paved the way for the planned collectivization of the rural lands, but sparked controversy among government ministers regarding the exact methods of the reform. Some ministers favored collectivization, while others were more willing to create rural cooperatives and peasant settlements. This caused confusion and chaos in the rural areas and signified an end to the welfare provided by the Alliance for Progress.²³ Allende also finished the complete nationalization of the copper industry, which was considered another large step in distancing Chile from the West.²⁴

Augusto Pinochet and the Coup (1973)

https://web.archive.org/web/20071031132043/http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_1140_1465/rev73.leonov.lect.ing.pdf

²¹ Leonov, 6

²² Leonov, 6-7

²³ Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, <https://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-3536.html>

²⁴ Fleming, John. March 1973. "The Nationalization of Chile's Large Copper Companies in Contemporary Interstate Relations". *Villanova Law Review*. 593-647
<https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&context=vlr>

Salvador Allende's anti-Capitalist actions, combined with his receipt of support from the Soviets, contributed to increased distaste for Allende and his administration within the Chilean elite, who were actively losing business. Allende's policies also began to anger some of the more conservative generals in the military, those who detested Socialism and Communism. One in particular was Augusto Pinochet, a Captain during Gonzalez's presidency. As a Captain, he led a raid against Communist miners on strike in Itatique in 1947, helped put down more Communist strikes in Lota and Coronel, and would later become the head of an internment camp at Pisagua. He had learned during that period that Communism was a sizable internal threat, and his experiences as a young officer would motivate his violent acts of repression against Communists during his administration.²⁵ The United States was beginning to find an opportunity to take advantage of unrest in Chile in 1973. After all, it seemed Allende's government was weakening, with one sign being a coup attempt in June 1973, dubbed the *Tanquetazo*, led by Colonel Roberto Souper.²⁶ The unrest culminated in steep economic decline, with workers of all professions on strike in the summer of 1973, the resignation of General Carlos Prats from his position as Minister of Defense and as General, and finally, the Supreme Court's accusations on Allende of unconstitutional acts.²⁷ After Prats resigned in August 1973, Pinochet took his place as Minister of Defense and Commander of the Chilean Army, which gave him a significant advantage for what he and other officers were planning. A year prior, Pinochet and his aides met with U.S. officials in the Panama Canal Zone, where he advocated for the removal of Allende. The American officials responded with a pledge of support if Pinochet decided to depose Allende.²⁸

²⁵ Lockhart, "La Ley Maldita: The Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy.", 98-125

²⁶ "Second coup attempt: El Tanquetazo (the tank attack)". RebelYouthCA. 2004.
https://web.archive.org/web/20041013002715/http://literature.rebelyouth.ca/educhile_1970s/tanquetazo.html

²⁷ Icarito. 2007. "The Crisis Breaks Out". *COPESA Digital Media*.
https://web.archive.org/web/20071109051221/http://www.latercera.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,38035857_178048856_151840547,00.html

²⁸ Devine, Jack, and Peter Kornbluh. "Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?" *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014): 168-174. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483316>.

In the months leading up to the tumult of August 1973, the CIA had been gathering information on what factions within the military would be the most successful at carrying out a coup.²⁹ Pinochet seemed better poised to take power within the coming weeks in his new position of power. On September 11, 1973, Pinochet and the Chilean military seized power, and Allende committed suicide. By the time of the coup, Allende had no more Soviet support. The USSR planned on sending a large shipment of weapons that year, but this plan was aborted once Allende's military aide-de-camp was assassinated. This ignited fears in both governments that a serious coup was imminent, which marked the end of serious Soviet involvement with Allende.³⁰ According to a CIA officer named Jack Devine, who was stationed in Chile at the time of the coup, he and along with the rest of the CIA had first heard of the coup two days prior.³¹ While it is still a controversial subject whether or not the CIA was involved with the coup itself, they certainly knew it was going to occur, knew of Pinochet, and planned to give support to his regime.³²

Violence and Dictatorship (1973-1990)

Pinochet immediately consolidated his power in the weeks and months following the September 11th coup. This included banning all Marxist parties, closing Congress, and creating prisons designed to brutally torture suspected leftists. Many were forced into exile, and there

²⁹ Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities. 1975. "Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973" *U.S. Government Printing Office*. 39-40
<https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94chile.pdf>

³⁰ Leonov, 24

³¹ Devine, Jack. "What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup Against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 4 (2014): 26-35. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483554>.

³² Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities. 39-40

were an estimated 3,000 extrajudicial killings during Pinochet's rule.³³ Early during his reign, Pinochet sought to align with other like-minded leaders of South America through Operation Condor, a program between regional intelligence services that sought to combat Communist movements in South America. Pinochet and these other leaders would carry out Condor through torture, imprisonment, and oftentimes assassination of their leftist opponents.³⁴ The CIA saw Condor as an opportunity to aid these governments in their operations, including Chile's. Most notably, from 1974 to 1977, the CIA was in contact with Manuel Contreras, who was the head of the *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (DINA, or National Intelligence Directorate), which carried out the heavy violence against political opponents. The CIA was cautious about its relationship with him, as they knew that Contreras would most likely ignore human rights laws and cut off ties to him once he was transferred away from the DINA.³⁵ One act of political violence the DINA committed during Pinochet's regime was the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Letelier was a former minister in Allende's cabinet living in the U.S. and advocated for the re-democratization of Chile. On September 21, 1976, Letelier and his assistant Ronni Moffitt were killed by a car bomb in Washington DC by agents of the DINA. It is possible that the U.S. government knew of Pinochet's involvement in this plot since a CIA document from 1978 stated, "Contreras told a confidant he authorized the assassination of Letelier on orders from Pinochet."³⁶ Despite this information, it can be assumed the U.S. continued to support Pinochet as they viewed Pinochet's government as the best method to combat Communism in the region.

³³ Lockhart, James. "Jefe de la Plaza: The Rise of Augusto Pinochet." In *Chile, the CIA and the Cold War: A Transatlantic Perspective*. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. 233-257

³⁴ "CIA Activities in Chile". Central Intelligence Agency. 2000. 6
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20000919/01-06.htm>

³⁵ "CIA Activities in Chile". Central Intelligence Agency. 2000. 16-18
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20000919/01-16.htm>

³⁶ Dinges, John . 2015. "A Bombshell on Pinochet's Guilt, Delivered Too Late." Newsweek. October 14, 2015.
<https://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/30/bombshell-pinochets-guilt-delivered-too-late-383121.html>.

In terms of economics, Pinochet wanted to rid Chile's economy of its Marxist influence. The military government sought to establish a *laissez-faire*, free-market system with little government intervention in economic dealings. This was perhaps the U.S.' largest contribution to the Pinochet administration because of the so-called "Chicago Boys." This was a group of economists educated at the University of Chicago, and its programs at the Catholic University of Chile, who were appointed as the top economic ministers and advisors during Pinochet's rule.³⁷ They privatized banks, healthcare, retirement, education, and pension systems.³⁸ These were meant to rapidly change Chile's economy to a more Capitalist economy, beyond even the United States' privatization policies. Since the Soviet Union had lost its influence over Chile through Allende, the USSR and Cuba, a major Soviet ally in Latin America, contacted underground groups willing to rebel against Pinochet. Some guerilla groups included the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and the Manuel Rodriguez Popular Front (FPMR), which, throughout Pinochet's rule, committed a series of brutal terrorist attacks that killed military, police, and civilians alike across the country.³⁹ One such attack included when the MIR destroyed a train track which resulted in a train crash that killed one hundred Chilean civilians.⁴⁰ They received training in Cuba and acquired additional funding from the Soviets to aid in said training. In addition, they received weapons from Soviet and Cuban ships that were then transferred over to chartered Chilean boats. In total, they received \$20 million from the Soviets, Cubans, and Nicaraguans in the 1980s to help finance these shipments of guns and explosives, where some of

³⁷ O'Brien, Phil, and Jackie Roddick. "The Making of the Coup 1970-1973." In *Chile: The Pinochet Decade: The Rise and Fall of the Chicago Boys*, Latin American Bureau, 1983. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1hj555t.7>. 30-41

³⁸ Matamala, Daniel . 2021. "The Complicated Legacy of the 'Chicago Boys' in Chile." ProMarket. September 12, 2021. <https://www.promarket.org/2021/09/12/chicago-boys-chile-friedman-neoliberalism/>.

³⁹ Hudson, Rex A. 1988. "Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Leninist Violence in the Americas". *The Cuban American National Foundation*. <https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/rex-hudson.htm>

⁴⁰ Hudson, <https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/rex-hudson.htm>

the weapons were used in an attempted assassination of Pinochet in 1986.⁴¹ The Soviets and Cubans committed these acts as covertly as possible so they would not disturb the United States, but still gave support to help limit American influence there, as proven by their financing of weapons to potentially kill Pinochet.

Conclusion

By 1988, the year of the scheduled plebiscite on whether or not Pinochet's rule would be extended another eight years, he was becoming increasingly unpopular. He was voted out after a plebiscite, and the military officially lost control of the government.⁴² The extent of the United States and the Soviet Union's impacts on Chile during this period can be seen in the present. Today, Chile's leftist President, Gabriel Boric, has begun work on identifying all of those who went missing during Pinochet's rule. Yet many still yearn for the days of his rule, as evidenced by the popularity of the right-wing Jose Antonio Kast, Boric's 2021 electoral opponent.⁴³ This division between those on Boric's and Kast's side shows how the Cold War deeply polarized Chilean politics to this day. With all of the relevance that the Cold War has on Chile still, it is important to understand the nation's history during that period and understand why the United

⁴¹ EFE. 1986. "100 Muertos Y 500 Heridos En Un Choque de Trenes En Chile." El País, February 19, 1986, sec. Internacional. https://elpais.com/diario/1986/02/19/internacional/509151616_850215.html.

⁴² Vergara, Eva, and Daniel Politi. 2023. "A Half-Century after Pinochet's Coup, Some Chileans Remember the Brutal Dictatorship Fondly." PBS NewsHour. September 5, 2023. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-half-century-after-pinochets-coup-some-chileans-remember-the-brutal-dictatorship-fondly>.

⁴³ Ramos Miranda, Natalia, and Fabian Cambero. 2021. "Chile Election Poll Shows Race Tightening as Polarized Showdown Nears." Reuters. Reuters. December 14, 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/chile-election-poll-shows-race-tightening-polarized-showdown-nears-2021-12-14/>.

States and the Soviet Union viewed Chile as important in their competition for influence in South America.

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https://web.archive.org/web/20071031132043/http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_1140_1465/rev73.leonov.lect.ing.pdf
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